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Abstract: The diagnosis of a migration crisis has prompted multiple processes of rebordering 
in Europe and beyond. These include the build-up of physical barriers like walls and fences, 
the tightening of asylum regimes, the expansion of biometric databases and the enrolment of 
authoritarian regimes in controlling Europe’s borders. These developments have prompted a 
revival of the image of the ‘fortress’ in critical accounts of the European border regime. 
Building on existing criticisms of the metaphor Fortress Europe, this article proposes an 
alternative political imaginary of the European border regime. Starting from a version of the 
autonomy of migration approach that is based on the notion of appropriation, it proposes to 
apprehend the European border regime as a parasitic and precarious apparatus of capture. This 
apparatus of capture tries to recuperate migrants’ practices of appropriation in order to turn the 
knowledge and creativity of these practices into a driving force for its own development. 
Important aspects of this dynamic are illustrated through two examples: the refinement of 
control mechanisms of the European visa regime and the repeated tightening of Germany’s 
asylum regime since the ‘summer of migration’ in 2015. Taken together, these examples 
illustrate three aspects of processes of recuperation: first, that legal changes often only 
formalise previously informal practices of recuperation, secondly, that the framing of migration 
in terms of crisis functions as a vehicle for processes of recuperation which open up, thirdly, 
new opportunities for practices of appropriation as they are incoherent. In sum, the reading of 
the European border regime as an apparatus of capture paves the way for more assertive 
antiracist politics as it invites us to apprehend increasingly violent forms of border control not 
as signs of strengths of the European border regime, but as indicators of its increasingly 
desperate fight for survival. 
 
Keywords: appropriation, asylum, autonomy of migration, crisis, political imagination 
 
Note: This is the accepted version of an article that will soon be published in the journal South 
Atlantic Quarterly in volume 116, issue 4. To retrieve the final version of the article please 
refer to the journal’s webpage: https://www.dukeupress.edu/South-Atlantic-Quarterly/  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Contact: Stephan.scheel@gmx.net  
 2 
 
‘To write against the statist imaginary is thus intended as an act of resistance – though admittedly not the bravest 
act of resistance one might imagine, since the state aims to dominate the thought of even those who oppose it 
(indeed one might even say especially those who oppose it). […] One of the implications of this is that the statist 
political imagination has assisted the state in setting limits on the theoretical imagination, acting as a block on the 
possibility of conceiving of a society beyond the state’ (Neocleous 2003: 6). 
 
If one compares contemporary media accounts and images of migration to the European Union 
(EU) with those of the ‘long summer of migration’ in 2015 (Kasparek and Speer 2015), when 
hundreds of thousands of migrants travelled unauthorised via the Balkan route to Northern 
Europe, the contrast is striking. In 2015 images and media accounts of migrants predominate. 
People with tired but hopeful faces. People on the road. People in overcrowded trains. People 
climbing over border fences with makeshift ladders. People claiming freedom of movement. 
The most impressive images show what has become known as the ‘march of hope’ – a powerful 
demonstration of freedom of movement by thousands of migrants who had decided to walk 
along the motorway from Budapest to Germany to end their blockage in Hungary. The march 
prompted the Austrian and German governments to abandon a cornerstone of the EU’s 
migration policy – the Dublin regulation – by opening their borders to the marching migrants.i 
The European border regime seemed to have collapsed. But only to re-emerge with 
unprecedented force and violence. This is at least the impression one gets if one compares the 
accounts above with images of subsequent years. Military personnel fending of migrants trying 
to cross the new barbed-wired fences at the border between Hungary and Serbia. A capsized 
boat with empty lifejackets floating in the waters of the Mediterranean. Cranes erecting 
concrete walls – financed with European money – along the Turkish border to Syria. Riot police 
demolishing makeshift houses during the eviction of ‘the jungle’ of Calais. A group of 
rounded-up migrants, sitting with hanging heads in the sand, after their interception by the 
Libyan coast guard. 
 These images of ever more laborious and increasingly violent forms of border control 
are often interpreted as evidence for a ‘Fortress Europe in the making’ (Jünemann, Scherer, 
and Fromm 2017). Indeed, the image of the fortress experiences a revival in light of the EU’s 
efforts to restore the public’s trust in the European border regime. Particularly the proliferation 
of walls and other physical barriers across Europe has contributed to the resurgence of the 
metaphor of the fortress in critical accounts of the European border regime (e.g. Amnesty 
International 2014, Carr 2012, Connolly 2015). The image of the fortress also proliferates in 
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slogans and leaflets of the antiracist movement.ii It is also not absent from academic works 
(e.g. Follis 2012, Jones 2016, Jünemann, Scherer, and Fromm 2017, Roos 2013).  
What dominates in academic debates are, however, more nuanced conceptions of 
border regimes. To highlight the link between global inequality and the proliferation of border 
controls, Fabian Georgi (2017) diagnoses, for instance, the emergence of a dystopian ‘fortress 
capitalism’ in which islands of relative prosperity are defended like a fortress against the 
‘wretched of the Earth’. The European border regime has also been likened to a selective filter 
that renders Europe as a ‘gated community’ (Van Houtum and Pijpers 2007). Or it is depicted 
as a banopticon that does not aim at the repression of mobility but at its institutionalisation 
through the creation of a satellite population that is always kept ‘in orbit’ i.e. at a distance and 
on the move (Bigo 2007). What all these images share is that they are based on the assumption 
that the EU and its member states can regulate migration as they please. This assumption has 
however been revealed as a myth by the ‘summer of migration’ 2015 when nearly one million 
migrants entered Europe unauthorized. What is needed are therefore alternative imaginations 
of the European border regime that convey its imperfection, precarity and ‘productive failure’ 
(Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008: 166), which results in the refinement of 
existing logics and mechanisms of control, rather than their radical overhaul or abandonment. 
 Hence, this article seeks to develop an alternative imaginary that does not overrate, like 
the images outlines above, the coherence and efficiency of the European border regime. This 
is important because how we imagine the European border regime has practical consequences. 
It shapes how we evaluate its operational logic and its effectiveness. It also affects how we 
assess migrants’ capacity to subvert mechanisms of regulation and control. This is why Sandro 
Mezzadra and Brett Neilson rightly critique the metaphor of the fortress for ‘driv[ing] the 
political imagination in a too linear way onto mechanisms of control and domination’ 
(Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 165). For a political imaginary conveys, according to the social 
theorist Susan Buck-Morss (2002: 12), not only a particular political logic, but also ‘a political 
landscape, a concrete visual field in which political actors are positioned.’ Hence, political 
imaginaries are political in and of themselves. They affect political agendas and practices by 
shaping how we envision the actors, issues and problems that are associated with the entity that 
is imagined in a particular way. This is because political imaginaries carry certain, mostly tacit 
assumptions about the entity they are meant to convey and elucidate.  
The imagination of Europe’s borders as the impenetrable walls of a well-guarded 
fortress goes, for example, together with the imagination of the migrant as a weak subject in 
need of support (cf. Mezzadra 2005). In this way the image of the fortress continues to shape 
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the politics and campaigns of many antiracist initiatives in Europe. Inspired by the work of 
William Walters (2006), who already explored alternative ways of imagining the borders of 
Europe a decade ago, this article develops a political imaginary that emphasises the precarity, 
incoherence and constant readjustment of the European border regime to open up a horizon for 
a more hopeful and assertive antiracist politics. 
 The following three sections therefore develop a reading of the European border regime 
as a parasitic and precarious apparatus of capture. This apparatus of capture tries to recuperate 
the practices by which migrants try to appropriate mobility to Europe in order to turn them into 
a driving force for the refinement of the means and methods of regulation and control. In this 
way the article advances the reading of migration as a ‘constituent force’, which has been 
developed by the autonomy of migration literature (Andrijasevic 2010, Karakayali and Rigo 
2010). It demonstrates, in brief, that we can actually observe a dynamic between migratory 
practices and their recuperation by the European border regime on the level of concrete tactics 
of appropriation of particular migrant subjects and not just the abstract level of migration. 
This argument will be developed in three moves. The first section outlines a reading of 
the autonomy of migration approach (AoM) which is based on the idea that migrants, rather 
than openly contesting border controls, tend to silently appropriate mobility by repurposing the 
mechanisms of control into means of appropriation. Subsequently it explains how this version 
of the AoM permits us to read the European border regime as a parasitic apparatus of capture. 
The second section illustrates the dynamic of migrants’ practices of appropriation and their 
recuperation by the border regime through an analysis of the refinement of control mechanisms 
in consulates in North Africa. This analysis is based on a multi-sited ethnography that studied 
migrants’ encounters with the Visa Information System (VIS), one of the largest biometric 
databases in the world, to assess how migrants appropriate mobility to Europe within biometric 
border regimes. The final section turns to the legislative overhaul of Germany’s asylum regime 
since the ‘migration crisis’ in 2015 to highlight three aspects of processes of recuperation: first, 
that legal changes often only formalise previously informal practices of recuperation, secondly, 
that the framing of migration in terms of crisis functions as a vehicle for processes of 
recuperation which are, thirdly, incoherent and produce new possibilities for the appropriation 
of mobility as they are disputed in a contested policy arena. 
 
 
Abandoning Fortress Europe: Thinking beyond the dungeon of antiracist politics 
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Despite repeated criticisms of the metaphor of Fortress Europe as ‘erroneous’ (Van Houtum 
and Pijpers 2007: 292) and as an inadequate image that ‘only vaguely conveys a sense of the 
mechanisms of power at stake’ (Walters 2004: 240), the reading of the European border regime 
as a ‘fortress in the making’ (Jünemann, Scherer, and Fromm 2017) currently experiences a 
revival. To develop alternative imaginary this section therefore introduces the AoM which has 
been developed as a critique of the Fortress Europe discourse. This impetus can already be 
discerned from the AoM’s main hypothesis.  
As suggested by its name, the AoM claims that migratory practices feature moments of 
autonomy – that is moments of uncontrollability and excess – in regards to attempts of 
controlling or regulating them (Moulier Boutang 1993). Yet, the AoM is not reducible to this 
provocative hypothesis. It rather provides a ‘heuristic model’ (Moulier Boutang 2007: 167) to 
study border regimes and migratory processes from the viewpoint of migrants and with a 
particular focus on migrants’ ‘border struggles’ (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 13). It is in this 
reversal of perspectives that the AoM’s theoretical legacy of autonomist Marxism and Italian 
Operaismo come to the fore. In contrast to orthodox Marxism’s assumption that the course of 
history is determined by economic laws inherent to the capitalist mode of production, Operaists 
regard the struggles of the working class as the ‘motor of history’. Just like Mario Tronti 
(1979a) argued for making the struggles of the working class, rather than the composition of 
regimes of accumulation, the starting point of the analysis, AoM scholars argue for focusing 
on migrants’ border struggles in the analysis of border regimes. This stance conflicts, of course, 
with the imagination of the European border regime as a fortress. Hence, the AoM’s proponents 
have developed a nuanced critique of the metaphor Fortress Europe that can be summarised in 
four points.  
 First, the image of the fortress overrates the efficiency of the European border regime. 
By denying the relative autonomy that the AoM’s proponents attribute to migration the image 
of the fortress would misrepresent the European border regime as an omnipotent control 
apparatus (Panagiotidis and Tsianos 2007). The AoM’s advocates emphasise in contrast 
migrants’ capacity to subvert border controls. This is why they conceive of Europe’s borders 
not as the impenetrable walls, but as sites of struggles over mobility and rights (Mezzadra and 
Neilson 2013: 183). Hence, they argue that the imagination of the European border regime as 
a fortress is based on a control biased analysis that only focuses on the means and methods of 
control while largely ignoring migrants’ proven capacity to render Europe’s borders porous 
(Scheel 2013a). 
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 Secondly, the AoM’s proponents discard the political imaginary of Fortress Europe as 
misleading because it does not account for the productivity of border regimes which do not aim 
at the repression but at the valorisation of human mobility (Mezzadra 2011). To abandon the 
paradigm of exclusion that informs the imaginary of the fortress, the AoM’s advocates argue 
that the European border regime follows a rationale of differential inclusion. This concept 
highlights the ‘hierarchizing and stratifying capacity’ (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 7) of 
border regimes which facilitate the gradual disenfranchisement of migrants. Working visa that 
tie a migrant’s residence title to the duration of the working contract make the visa holder, for 
instance, vulnerable to blackmailing by the employer, thus creating labour relations that are 
unfree insofar as they feature coercive forces other than the economic need of selling one’s 
labour power (Moulier Boutang 1998).  
 Thirdly, the image of the fortress attributes too much coherence, or even a systemic 
logic, to migration policy and border controls (Karakayali and Tsianos 2007: 12). Migration 
policy constitutes, however, a contested policy arena in which a multiplicity of actors compete 
over influence, budgets and agendas. To emphasise the incoherence of migration policies AoM 
scholars have developed the notion of the migration regime (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 178-
179, Tsianos and Karakayali 2010). They draw on Giuseppe Sciortino’s definition who stresses 
that ‘a country's migration regime is usually not the outcome of consistent planning’ but the 
result of ‘generations of turf wars between bureaucracies and wave after wave of ‘quick fixes’ 
for emergencies […] (2004: 32-33). Thus, the notion of the regime analytically captures a 
multiplicity of actors without attributing a systemic logic to their practices. Instead, attempts 
to regulate migration become conceivable as temporary compromises and overdetermined 
condensations of the practices of a multiplicity of actors (Tsianos and Karakayali 2010: 376). 
A central theoretical reference point for this conception of border regimes is Foucault’s notion 
of the dispositif, understood as a ‘thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble’ that is characterised by 
a ‘functional overdetermination because each effect […] enters into resonance or contradiction 
with the others and thereby calls for a re-adjustment or a re-working of the heterogeneous 
elements that surface at various points’ (1980 [1977]: 194-195). 
 Finally, AoM scholars criticise the metaphor of the fortress because it is interrelated 
with the imagination ‘of the migrant as a weak subject  […] in need of care and assistance […]’ 
(Mezzadra 2005: 46). One factor explaining the continued popularity of the image of Fortress 
Europe seems to be that it creates, like any political imaginary a set of relational subject 
positions, ‘a political landscape […] in which political actors are positioned’ (Buck-Morss 
2002: 12). These include, besides the migrant as a weak subject in need of support, the ‘evil’ 
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border guard as a stand-in for the fortress-like European border regime and, finally, the ‘good’ 
humanitarian aid-worker providing assistance to migrants or heroic antiracist activist fighting 
against an allegedly all-powerful border regime. In this way the imagination of the European 
border regime as a well-guarded fortress facilitates paternalistic proxy policies as pursued by 
many humanitarian organisations as well as some antiracist groups (Mitropoulos 2007).  
Thus, the imagination of the European border regime as a fortress operates as a kind of 
dungeon for antiracists politics. Due to the control biased analysis that underpins the political 
imaginary of the fortress, and the related blindness to migrants’ capacity to subvert border 
controls, the Fortress Europe discourse cannot but make the features of allegedly omnipotent 
border regimes the starting point for political campaigns and demands (Bojadžijev, Karakayali, 
and Tsianos 2001). Hence, the political imagination of the fortress results in campaigns and 
demands that tend to be defensive, reformist and reactive insofar as they appeal to governments 
on moral grounds to attenuate the restrictive effects of allegedly omnipotent border regimes.  
The following attempt of developing an alternative political imaginary of the European 
border regime should therefore be understood as a response to a challenge that has already been 
formulated, more than a decade ago, by members of the research group Transit Migration.  
They regard the persistence of the inadequate and politically counter-productive metaphor of 
the fortress primarily as ‘an expression of the difficulty to grasp the turbulence of migration’ 
(Karakayali and Tsianos 2007: 13). Hence, they call for the imagination ‘of a representational 
arrangement in which migrations change societies rather than simply bouncing off’ (13). 
To develop such an alternative political imaginary this article starts from the conception 
of ‘migration as a constituent force in the production of the European polity and citizenship’ 
(Andrijasevic 2010: 162). Migration operates as a constituent force in the development of the 
European border regime insofar as ‘migrants, even when formally (i.e. legally) excluded from 
citizenship, are politically included in its domain to the extent that they contest the existing 
territorial distribution of membership and compel the legal and political space to reorganise 
itself around human mobility’ (Karakayali and Rigo 2010: 127). This is why AoM scholars 
regard migration as ‘the dynamic moment in a migration regime’ (Karakayali and Tsianos 
2005: 50). Rather than as weak subjects, migrants emerge as non-negligible protagonists in the 
development of the European border regime as their practices regularly escape and exceed the 
control capacities of the existing border regime, forcing the latter into a process of adaptation 
and reorganisation (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008: 77-78). 
However, this stance does not imply an undifferentiated celebration of migrant agency, 
in which autonomy is misunderstood as pure self-legislation or unrestricted self-determination 
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free of any effects of practices of government. Quite to the contrary, migrants’ practices are 
shaped by the mechanisms and methods of control that they seek to recode into means of 
appropriation, as I explain below. Moreover, migrants are not able to usurp the mechanisms of 
control completely for their purposes. This is why practices of appropriation afford concessions 
and compromises on behalf of migrants and result in outcomes that are polyvalent, partial and 
contested. The successful entering of Europe via a Schengen visa that has been appropriated 
via manipulated documents supporting a fictive biography of a well-to-do traveler does, for 
instance, not signal an unequivocal victory over the European border regime. It rather results 
in a compromise: living and working in Europe as a ‘visa-overstayer’ are possible, but only 
under the precarious conditions of illegality and deportability. (Scheel 2018, forthcoming).  
The crucial point is that migrants’ practices of appropriation feature, despite these 
polyvalent and contested outcomes, moments of uncontrollability and excess that escape the 
capacities of existing mechanisms of control. And it is these moments of uncontrollability and 
excess that force the European border regime to reorganize and adapt the means and methods 
of regulation and control by trying to recuperate migrants’ practices of appropriation. In this 
way the notion of appropriation refines the reading of migration as a constituent force as it 
permits us to locate the capacity of migratory practices to instigate transformation processes 
not only in an abstract social process – migration – but in concrete practices of appropriation 
of embodied migrant subjects. Consequently, contemporary mechanisms of border control 
emerge as recuperated forms of practices that were previously successfully mobilized by 
migrants to appropriate mobility (Shukaitis 2009: 48). 
In general, the concept of appropriation highlights the intricate interwovenness of 
migrants’ practices with the devices, methods and logics of control as it is based on the idea 
that migrants try to recode the latter into means allowing for the appropriation of mobility 
(Scheel 2018, forthcoming). For practices of appropriation follow a rationale of repurposing. 
Due to the asymmetrical power relations that characterise situations of border control, migrants 
are usually not in a position to openly challenge the actors and methods of control. Instead of 
openly contesting the rules and regulations of border regimes, practices of appropriation 
simulate compliance with the former, but only to clandestinely subvert them. In other words, 
practices of appropriation operate – like the tactics described by Michel de Certeau (1984: 37) 
– in an environment they do not own. They resemble manoeuvres ‘within enemy territory’ (37). 
The repurposing of the means and methods of control is possible because migrants are 
implicated in the control of their mobility not only as passive objects, but also as acting subjects 
because the capacity of border regimes to regulate human mobility derives from, but also 
 9 
hinges on, the active participation of those whose mobility they are designed to govern. In 
consulates staff ask visa applicants for instance numerous questions and demand various 
documents to assess their ‘will to return’ to their country of origin. But the visa applicants are 
the ones who provide the answers and documents. 
This article is however concerned with another important aspect of the intricate 
intertwinement of migrants’ practices of appropriation with the means and methods of control. 
In brief, the former shape – via their recuperation through the border regime – the development 
of the latter. Put simply, practices of appropriation are enmeshed in a dynamic of subversion 
of and recuperation by the border regime. In contrast to de Certeau’s idea of tactics, the notion 
of appropriation underscores that this ‘art of the weak’ (1984: 34) is not without effect on the 
border regime. Migrants’ practices of appropriation emerge as the ‘ghost in the machine’ that 
animates the refinement of the mechanisms of control and the constant reorganisation of the 
border regime as a whole. The latter emerges as a precarious and parasitic apparatus of capture 
that leeches on the knowledge and creativity that is engrained in migrants’ practices of 
appropriation, as the next section illustrates through an account of the development of the 
mechanisms of control deployed in consulates of EU member states. 
 
 
Apprehending the European border regime as a parasitic apparatus of capture 
One afternoon, I am sitting with M in his back office. M is the visa section’s head of a consulate 
representing an EU member state in a country in North Africa (hereafter: consulate Z). He is 
processing visa applications from the past few days. This is a tiresome bureaucratic routine, 
largely determined by the computer software. Before M can mark a file as complete, the 
software searches four different databases, using as search criteria the first three letters of the 
applicant’s name and, in the case of the VIS, the applicant’s biometric data. Besides the VIS, 
the software also searches the Schengen Information System (SIS), the local ‘black list’ and a 
‘national list’ containing data about all applications received worldwide by the visa sections of 
the country which consulate Z represents.iii 
Suddenly M gets excited: ‘Here you have a hit in the VIS!’ He was just about to process 
an application by a young woman who is requesting a Schengen visa to visit her sister’s brother 
in law. M flips through the empty pages of her brand new passport. ‘See! She tries to hide the 
fact that she has already been refused a visa by [name of consulate]!’ His computer screen 
shows that this refusal happened six months ago. But M can only see the name of the applicant, 
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her date of birth, the date she applied, the type of visa she applied for, the outcome and her 
application’s file number. M calls his colleagues at the consulate that rejected the young 
woman’s previous application. His colleague tells M that she previously applied for a family 
visit visa. She wanted to visit her sister, who lives with her husband in Europe. But consular 
staff assumed a high ‘migration risk’ due to the woman’s age, her low income and her family 
ties in Europe. I ask M what he will do now. ‘Of course, I will reject. She tried to cheat!’ 
 This account demonstrates that migrants confront recuperated forms of previously 
successful practices of appropriation when they try to appropriate mobility within and against 
the European border regime (Shukaitis 2009: 48). The VIS illustrates this dynamic. One of its 
purposes is to forestall practices of appropriation subsumed under the pejorative label ‘visa 
shopping’ (EP and Council 2008). Among others, ‘visa shopping’ refers to lodging further visa 
applications at the consulates of different Schengen member states after an initial application 
has been rejected by another member state. Stamping applicants’ passports can be read as an 
attempt to recuperate this practice of appropriation.iv The example of the young women 
highlights that migrants respond to this recuperation by using new passports to conceal stamps 
which indicate previous rejections. The VIS emerges as the latest recuperation of migrants’ 
practices of appropriation in this conflictive dialogue of actions. Since the VIS also stores the 
digitized fingerprints of rejected visa applicants for a period of five years, consular staff can 
now check through a search in this biometric database ‘if this fingerprint has already applied 
for a visa’, as a border guards put it in an interview. Hence, the VIS can be read as a ‘negative 
result’ of previously successful practices of appropriation (Negri 2005 [1977]: 242). 
This example illustrates that migrants’ border struggles impose the need on the border 
regime to constantly adapt, update and refine existing mechanisms of regulation and control. 
Practices of appropriation that exceed and escape the capacities of existing control mechanisms 
are translated, via their stigmatisation in terms of ‘fraud’ and ‘deceit’ through pejorative labels 
such as ‘visa shopping’, in a call for more and ‘better’ border security practices and 
technologies to tame the allegedly excessive agency of migrants. In this way migrants are 
framed as cunning tricksters using all kinds of ruses to get a visa to Europe. What is concealed 
by this ‘trickster narrative’ is however that it is the highly restrictive Schengen visa regime that 
provoke practices of appropriation in the first place. In general, the Schengen visa regime 
renders mobility to Europe as a scarce resource through the introduction of an entry ticket 
whose receipt is subject to the fulfilment of numerous requirements that do not correspond to 
the living and working conditions of most of the people who are subjected to a visa 
requirement. Hence, the visa regime resembles a machine of illegalization that entices the 
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former to engage in delinquent practices like ‘visa shopping’ or ‘document fraud’ (cf.  Scheel 
2017b). Migrants’ attempts to appropriate visa are subsequently mobilised – via their framing 
in terms of ‘fraud’ and betrayal’ – as evidence for the claimed need to refine and expand 
existing mechanisms of control. Foucault (1980 [1977]: 195) describes this dynamic as the 
‘strategic elaboration’ of the security dispositif. Ultimately, the European border regime 
emerges as a parasitic apparatus of capture that works through the recuperation of practices of 
appropriation which are provoked by the very raison d’etre of this security dispositif to render 
mobility to Europe a scarce and precious resource. 
 
In this context it is crucial to note that the practices and technologies evolving from 
processes of recuperation are informed by the knowledge and modus operandi of the practices 
of appropriation they seek to capture and foreclose. In the example above the usage of 
biometric technologies for tracing rejected visa applicants responds to the latter’s tactic to 
conceal previous rejections through the usage of new passports that do not bear a stamp 
signaling a negative decision by another consulate. Since a paper document can be manipulated 
or replaced by migrants in order to be recoded from a device of control into a means of 
appropriation, the border regime seeks to recuperate this practice of appropriation by resorting 
to a device of control migrants will find difficult to temper with: their own bodies which are 
used as ‘an indisputable anchor to which data can be safely secured’ (Amoore 2006: 342). Just 
as Mario Tronti describes the automation of industrial production in the 1970s as ‘successive 
attempts of the capitalist class to emancipate itself from the working class’ (Tronti 1979b), we 
can understand this instance of technologisation as an attempt to emancipate the border regime 
from migrants’ capacity to act by rendering their very bodies as a means of control. 
The example of practices stigmatised as ‘corruption’ illustrates, in turn, that practices 
of appropriation sometimes even shape the entire organisational and architectural structure of 
institutions of border control. The frequency with which ‘visa scandals’ are discovered 
indicates that the relationship between the visa regime and corruption is as 'paradoxical' as the 
'the state-smuggler relationship' described by Peter Andreas (2000: 22). Corruption is pursued 
by the state, whose laws and regulations create the incentives and conditions for its existence 
in the first place. What is peculiar to this mode of appropriation is that it relies on the recoding 
of the agents of control into brokers of mobility (cf. Scheel 2018, forthcoming). What interests 
us here are the anti-corruption measures that have been implemented in consulates. They 
include the introduction of the 'four eye-principle' in the decision-making procedure. In 
consulate Z, which harbours a medium-sized visa section, members of staff receiving 
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applicants never decide on visa applications, but can only influence their outcome through an 
‘advice’ they provide in the electronic file. The decision is taken by M who works in the back-
office and is never in direct contact with the applicants. In large visa sections, which receive 
hundreds of applications every day the processing of visa applications is subdivided into 
numerous small tasks. In his study on a large French visa section Alexis Spire has aptly invoked 
the image of an assembly line to capture this division of the processing of visa applications 
into multiple minor tasks executed in constant repetition by specialised staff who are 
nevertheless subjected to a rotation scheme (2009: 93). The official reason for these measures, 
which shape the organisational structure of visa sections, is the prevention of corruption 
(Gouteyron 2007: 53, Spire 2009: 23). What these anti-corruption measures illustrate is that it 
is ‘by means of a continual theft of the [knowledge] generated by [migrants’] struggles’ that 
border regimes ‘create increasingly complex mechanisms of domination’ (Negri 2005 [1982]). 
 
 
Recuperation through crisis-talk: protecting the asylum regime from refugees 
The history of the transformation of Germany’s asylum regime is a history of recuperation of 
migrants’ practices of appropriation. This history began in 1993. In that year the constitution 
was changed to restrict access to asylum, which had become the main channel of entry after 
the end of the guest worker regime with the so-called recruitment stop in 1973. In the absence 
of other legal migration options ‘labour migrants in the 1970s and 1980s had to invent stories 
of “political persecution”’ to appropriate entry to and residence in Germany (Karakayali and 
Rigo 2010). In 1993 access to the asylum procedure was restricted through the introduction of 
the requirement that only people who had not entered Germany from an EU member state or 
another ‘safe third country’ could apply. These heavily contested changes took place in context 
of a surge of Neo-Nazi attacks on reception centers for asylum seekers. Critics accused the 
government therefore of rewarding the violent ‘politics of the street’ of the far-right. 
After a phase of relative stability there have been no less than five law packages since 
the ‘summer of migration’ in 2015 that implicate significant changes to the German asylum 
regime. These include the ‘Law for the Redefinition of the Right to Remain’ (RRR) from June 
2015, the ‘Asylum Package I’ (AP1) from October 2015, the ‘Asylum Package II’ (AP2) from 
March 2016, the Law on Integration (LON) from July 2016 and the ‘Law for the better 
Enforcement of Returns’ (LER) from June 2017. The overall impetus of these law packages is, 
without a doubt, to reduce the number of asylum seekers and to ‘manage’ the integration or 
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return of those who have already arrived.v This analysis focuses on three legal changes that are 
particularly serious from migrants’ viewpoint (for a detailed account of all legal changes see: 
Lehnert 2017). It shows that, to achieve this overall objective, the proposed measures aim at 
the recuperation of migrants’ practices of appropriation. Based on this analysis I will elaborate 
three important aspects of processes of recuperation. 
Nearly all law packages feature measures aiming at a more ‘efficient’ enforcement of 
deportations of rejected asylum seekers. They seek to address the so-called ‘deportation-gap’ 
– the divergence between the number of migrants issued with a return order and the much 
smaller number of people who are actually deported (Gibney and Hansen 2003). Following a 
communication by the European Commission (EC), the so-called ‘rate of effective returns’ (the 
rate of deportable migrants who are actually returned to ‘third countries’ outside the EU) stood 
below 40% in 2014 and 2015 (EC 2017: 2). The most important obstacle for the execution of 
deportations are illegalised migrants’ attempts to conceal their identity and country of origin if 
they are apprehended by authorities and to ‘go underground’ if the latter’s efforts to re-identify 
them have been successful (EMN 2013). In interviews conducted in 2013, officials of two 
deportation departments in Germany confirmed that migrants would often ‘claim to be citizens 
of a country to which we cannot deport them.’ People from Morocco or Tunisia would, for 
example, claim to come from Algeria or Libya – and more recently Syria (cf. Scheel 2018, 
forthcoming). The posing of a citizen of another nation-state constitutes a powerful tactic by 
which deportable migrants try to appropriate a precarious residency in Germany.  
Many of the recent legal changes respond to this mode of appropriation. They include 
the introduction of ‘deportation custody’ for deportable migrants to prevent absconding (RRR). 
Furthermore, the LER lays down that deportations have no longer to be announced in advance 
(Pro Asyl 2017). AP2 stipulates, in turn, that asylum seekers who fail to cooperate with 
authorities in re-identification procedures or have destroyed their identity papers have to live 
in reception centres that are located in remote areas. Thus, asylum seekers are prevented from 
forging social ties and cut off from support by other social groups which may hinder the 
execution of deportations (Lehnert 2017). 
Another noteworthy revision concerns §48 of the residency law by the RRR. It allows 
staff of migration administrations (Ausländerbehörde) to search mobile phones, laptops and 
other data carriers for clues on the identity and country of origin of deportable migrants. The 
LER expands this prerogative. It enables the central migration administration (known as 
‘BAMF’) to search data carriers of all asylum seekers during the asylum procedure (Pro Asyl 
2017: 17). This will allow authorities to look for evidence on asylum seekers’ travel routes to 
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invoke the Dublin regulation if the person has entered Germany through another EU member 
state (20). These changes respond to the increasing use of smart phones and social media by 
migrants as means to exchange information on the travel routes and other ‘best practices’ of 
appropriation. The image of the ‘smartphone-wielding migrant’ gained particular prominence 
during the summer of migration (Gillespie et al. 2016: 23). Following media reports it was the 
circulation of a tweet by the BAMF on the temporary suspension of the Dublin regulation in 
social networks which prompted migrants to start the ‘march of hope’ (Ullrich 2017). The 
attempt to recuperate migrants’ digital literacy for purposes of control confirms that 
smartphones and social media are ambivalent means of appropriation since the data traces 
migrants leave behind ‘make them vulnerable to […] unwanted state surveillance’ (Gillespie 
et al. 2016: 9). 
One of the most contested legal changes concerns the suspension of family reunification 
for a period of two years for people with ‘subsidiary protection’. Since the introduction of this 
clause by AP2 the BAMF only grants subsidiary protection, instead of full refugee status, to 
asylum seekers from Syria. This measure responds to the tactic to send one family member on 
the expensive and demanding journey to Europe so that this pioneer can appropriate mobility 
to Europe for others by applying for family reunification. Hence, the restriction of family 
reunification will certainly generate ‘a vast new business area for smugglers’ (Lehnert 2017).  
Taken together, these transformations of the German asylum regime illustrate three 
important aspects of processes of recuperation. First, legal changes may constitute the final, 
but by no means a necessary step of processes of recuperation. The legal changes permitting 
authorities to search migrants’ data carriers only formalise a highly intrusive practice that had 
already been established on the informal level in local migration administrations (ANA-ZAR 
2010). This example confirms that processes of recuperation are mostly initiated by street-level 
bureaucrats who develop informal practices that aim at the recuperation of migrants’ practices 
of appropriation (Scheel 2017a). In many cases such practices are never formalised through 
legal changes, but rather become virulent on the street-level of policy implementation. The 
most adequate method to account for these informal practices, and the tactics of appropriation 
by which they are shaped and informed, is the ethnographic study of migrants’ embodied 
encounters with the means and methods of control (Scheel 2013b). 
 Secondly, debates on the measures outlined above illustrate that ‘crisis-talk’ operates 
as a vehicle for processes of recuperation. The debate on the restriction of family reunification 
was for instance dominated by fear-mongering prognoses predicting ‘another migration crisis’ 
that would exceed the allegedly already exhausted ‘reception capacities of Germany’. 
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According to these highly speculative predictions every refugee would bring three or more 
family members to Germany by applying for family reunification (Meiritz and Elmer 2015). 
This example demonstrates that the framing of migration in terms of ‘”crisis” […] appears to 
be precisely a device for the authorization of exceptional or “emergency” governmental 
measures – and their normalization – towards the ends of enhanced and expanded border 
enforcement and immigration policing’ (De Genova et al. 2016). What explains its capacity to 
facilitate processes of recuperation is that the term crisis denotes ‘a marked discontinuity’, a 
disruption of the status quo (Lindley 2014: 2). Hence, the framing of migration events in terms 
of crisis generates an imperative to act that justifies the implementation of more and ‘better’ 
mechanisms of border control. This explains why ‘crisis labelling in relation to migration has 
emerged over the past two decades as a routine practice in European governmental arenas’ 
(Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2014: 119). It also explains why virtually all major 
transformations of the European border regime in the same period have been accompanied by 
some form of ‘crisis-talk’. The routine invocation of a ‘migration crisis’ points in turn to the 
recuperation of the term crisis itself. The latter has been transformed from a vehicle of radical 
critique and call for revolutionary change into a device of recuperation and depoliticised 
technocratic ‘problem management’ that aims at the restoration of the status quo, as Willem 
Schinkel (2015) rightly notes. By uncovering the processes of recuperation that are facilitated 
by the rather routine ‘crisis-talk’ about migration, the reading of the European border regime 
as a parasitic apparatus of capture has the potential to expand the horizon of ‘political 
imagination beyond crisis recovery and beyond politics as problem management’ (48). 
 Finally, recuperation resembles an active process of innovation whose outcome is not 
determined in advance. This is because processes of recuperation are neither fully determined 
by the modus operandi of the practices of appropriation they seek to capture, nor are they 
underpinned by a unified strategy. The European border regime is and remains a fractured and 
heterogeneous security dispositif whose functional overdetermination also characterises the 
constant repair work invested in its development. The question of how to harness migrants’ 
practices of appropriation is disputed in a contested policy arena in which a multiplicity of 
actors compete with one another over influence, competence and funding. This is why logics 
of securitization, economization, marketization, humanitarization etc. intersect and conflict 
within processes of recuperation, producing contradictory outcomes and incoherent policies. 
The five law packages mentioned above include, for instance, a variety of changes that point 
towards the infusion of an economic utilitarianism in the asylum regime that sometimes 
counters their overall restrictive impetus (Scherschel 2016). For instance, AP1 opens the labour 
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market for temporary agency work to asylum seekers, while the LOI ties receipt of a permanent 
residence permit for recognized refugees to successful economic performance (Lehnert 2017).  
The functional overdetermination and fragmentation of the European border regime 
also explains why the recuperation of migrants’ practices of appropriation does not culminate 
in watertight controls or a ‘fortress in the making’. Rather than insurmountable mechanisms of 
control, processes of recuperation generate ad-hoc measures and compromised policies that 
roll and tumble over each other, inescapably creating un-intended side-effects, inconsistencies 
and tensions, which open up new possibilities for practices of appropriation. The attempt to 
turn migrants’ use of smart phones and social media into a source of surveillance and control 
opens up the possibility to appropriate refugee status through the provision of doctored mobile 
phones that contain pictures of alleged countries of origin and travel routes which provide 
evidence for a convincing story of prosecution (Rath 2017). Hence, the imagination of the 
European border regime as a parasitic apparatus of capture highlights, in contrast to the image 
of the fortress, the incoherence, precarity and unstable nature of this vast security dispositif. 
 
Conclusion 
This article develops an alternative political imaginary for the European border regime beyond 
the much critiqued but still influential image a fortress. The latter is based on a control biased 
analysis that overrates the coherence and efficiency of border regimes. It is also politically 
counterproductive because it facilitates paternalistic proxy policies and defensive antiracist 
politics that make the features of an allegedly omnipotent border regime the reference point of 
political demands and campaigns. Inspired by the AoM’s conception of migration as a 
constituent force, the article therefore proposes to apprehend the European border regime as a 
parasitic apparatus of capture that strives on migrants’ practices of appropriation as a driving 
force for its own development. This political imaginary envisions the European border regime 
as a fragmented and precarious security dispositif which is haunted by the need to recuperate 
practices of appropriation that escape it’s the capacities of existing control mechanisms. It is 
the insubordination of migrants and their attempts to appropriate mobility within and against 
contemporary border regimes that force the latter into a permanent process of adaptation and 
reorganization. Migrants no longer emerge as weak subjects in need of help and support, but 
as non-negligible actors whose tactics of border-crossing shape, via their recuperation, the form 
and composition of the mechanisms of control. This is not to suggest that the image of the 
apparatus of capture accounts for all aspects of contemporary border regimes, or that it is the 
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only adequate figure of thought. As William Walters (2006: 145) points out, ‘[i]f borders are 
multiplicities then we need a plurality of concepts to think their diﬀerent dimensions and 
changing functions.’ A crucial advantage of the political imaginary of apparatus of capture is, 
however, that it can facilitate more assertive and hopeful antiracist politics. By shifting the 
focus on migrants’ practices of appropriation and border struggles, it opens up the possibility 
for antiracist politics that would not only lose their often paternalistic character, but would also 
no longer be compelled to operate on the terrain of the border regime. Instead of appealing to 
governments on moral grounds to attenuate the restrictive effects of allegedly omnipotent 
border regimes, migrants’ practices would become the focal point of an antiracist politics that 
demands nothing but the acknowledgement of what is already happening anyway: the mundane 
appropriation of mobility and residency by migrants. Just as Wendy Brown (2010) has shown 
that the proliferation of walls along national demarcation lines should not be taken as signs of 
unbroken state sovereignty, but rather as symptoms of its decline, the political imaginary of 
the apparatus of capture invites us to apprehend the resort to increasingly violent and indeed 
necropolitical forms of border control not as signs of restoration and strength of the European 
border regime, but as indicators of its increasingly desperate fight for survival. 
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Endnotes 
i The Dublin regulation sets out principles that determine which EU member state is responsible for the processing 
of asylum claims. The most central principle stipulates that this is the responsibility of the member state through 
which an asylum seeker first entered the European Union. 
ii UNITED for intercultural Action, a European network against nationalism, racism, and fascism runs for instance 
the campaign ‘The Fatal Policies of Fortress Europe’ in which it documents all migrant deaths resulting from the 
European border regime. In 2015 the European Grassroots Antiracist Movement (EGAM) organised a conference 
entitled ‘Dismantling Fortress Europe to build democracy!’. And in August 2015 the antiracist initiative Melting 
Pot started the campaign ‘over the fortress’ in which it tries provide independent monitoring of the situation along 
the Balkan and Central Mediterranean routes. Other examples abound. 
iii The VIS stores the fingerprints and facial images of all visa applicants for a period of 5 years. The SIS is relevant 
for the processing of visa applications because it alerts consular staff on people with an entry ban. The black list 
is a local list with alerts on applicants who have previously been detected when they tried to appropriate a visa. 
iv In practice consular staff stamp all passports on an empty page when the visa application is lodged. The stamp 
indicates the name of the consulate and the date of the receipt of the visa application. If the application is successful 
the visa sticker will be attached to the same page, thus covering the stamp. In case of a refusal the stamp remains 
visible, thus diminishing the passport holder’s chances of success in future visa applications. 
v This is not so say that all of the changes can be reduced to a restrictive approach, as I explain below. In sum, the 
law packages aim however at the reduction of arriving asylum seekers and the return of those whose applications 
have been rejected. This impetus is also highlighted by measures on EU-level that have been implemented in the 
same period. They include the infamous ‘EU-Turkey deal’ or the related ‘hotspot approach’ in the Mediterranean 
where arriving migrants are fingerprinted in closed detention centers to assure their deportability.       
                                                 
